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"Woman" in the Service of National Identity
by Julie Mertus*
INTRODUCTION}
Close your eyes and imagine a woman from ex-Yugoslavia. 2 What
does she look like? Is she haggard, hollow-eyed, despondent, babushkaclad with baby in tow, lugging water, dodging bullets in the streets of
Sarejevo, weeping uncontrollably over the death of her
sonlhusband/father/child, consoled by a kindly old gentleman?
We all know what the women of ex-Yugoslavia look like because CNN
tells us so.
Yet women hold prominent posts in nearly every nongovernmental
organization in the ex-Yugoslavia - from peace organizations, to human
rights groups, to pro-intervention groups. Although this phenomenon holds
true around· the world, the presence of women in ex-Yugoslavia is
particularly pronounced. After all, so many of the men are fighting, dead,
subsisting in concentration camps and/or drunk, dazed and confused.
Where are the pictures of the women of the ex-Yugoslavia as lawyers,
doctors, academics, journalists, leaders?3 When in the ex-Yugoslavia, I run

* Former Counsel, Human Rights WatchlHelsinki, New York City (formerly Helsinki
Watch); Adjunct Associate Professor, New York University. The views of the author do
not necessarily reflect those of her employers. A version of this paper was presented at The
Network of East-West Women's conference on "Gender Nationalism and Democratization,"
Washington D.C., October 26-27, 1993. The author would like to thank Ann Snitow, Lepa
Mladjenovic, and Marianna Katzarova for their encouragement and inspiration.
1. This introduction is drawn in part from Julie Mertus, Woman Warriors, THE VILLAGE
VOICE, Oct. 5, 1993, at 20.
2. "Yugoslav" and "Yugoslavia" refer to the self-proclaimed Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, the union of Serbia (including the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo) and
Montenegro. Although claiming successor status to the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia,
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has not been officially recognized as a successor state.
Still, the current Yugoslavian state's declaration that it wishes to be recognized as a
successor state implies that it is willing to accede to international agreements to which the
former Yugoslavia was a party. For a general statement on the duties of successor states,
see RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES § 208 (1986).
3. A major exception is an article about women soldiers by Chuck Sudetic, In Sarajevo,
War Also Means Battles of the Sexes, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1993, §1, at 12.
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into women activists at every tum. Why can't journalists seem to find
them?
Maybe journalists are just lazy; perhaps they simply regurgitate what
the state feeds them. Maybe they try to write stories about women
activists, but their editors instead plaster stories of women victims across
their front pages to increase circulation. Headlines screaming "Rape/Death
Camps" sell papers;4 headlines announcing "Women Organize for
Themselves" are thought to tum readers away. Journalists soon learn the
formula to creating a "good story:" exploit differences, ignore similarities,
and sensationalize the plight of victims.
Regardless of the ultimate intentions of journalists and editors, their
myopic focus on victims ultimately harms women. s By excluding images
of women as activists, the media conspires with other power brokers who
seek to use real and imagined "Woman" to suit their own needs. In
particular, journalists play into the hand of nationalists who eagerly use this
mythical Woman to build and empower their own nation. In the context
of the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia, this essay examines the use of women by
nation builders and the crucial role of the media in the process.

I.

A WORD ON TERMINOLOGY AND THE LIMITATIONS
OF THIS DISCUSSION

Any discussion of nation building should recognize that there are many
nations and no single privileged narrative of either "nation" or "nationalism.,,6 A discussion of the process of defining nation and nationalisms
must be left to a longer text, but suffice it to say, "nationalism is neither
inherently reactionary nor inherently progressive.,,7 Rather, like gender:

4. See, e.g., Ms., July/Aug. 1993 (announcing Catherine MacKinnon's story on
"Rape/Death Camps" with a blaring headline encompassing the entire front cover, gasping
"Exclusive," and using red lettering for the word "Death," designed apparently to look like
blood).
5. For a discussion of the making and impact of local propaganda, see Petar Lukovic,
Media and War: Yugoslavia, The Mirror of Hatred, in YUGOSLAVIA: COLLAPSE, WAR,
CRIMES 73 (Sonja Biserko ed., 1993) (limited edition book published by the Centre for
Anti-War Action & Association of Independent Intellectuals "Belgrade Circle") (copy on
file with author).
6. See Introduction: Narrating the Nation, in NATION AND NARRATION 1 (Homi K.
Bhabha ed., 1990).
7. ANDREW PARKER ET AL., Introduction to NATIONALISMS AND SEXUALITIES 5 (1992).
In an earlier paper, I argued that:
Nationalist discourse is incompatible with feminist visions of equality, since
"nationhood" is an artificially created means to an end, and that "end" is gaining
power over the imagined "Other." Those with least power already are asked to
sacrifice their identity to the state imagination, for furtherance of the national
interest. Nationalist struggles thus are antithetical to empowerment of diverse
groups, not merely because they demand conformity and create a faux homogeneity, but because their very foundation is built on the backs of the disempowered.
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[N]ationality is a relational term whose identity derives from its
inherence in a system of differences. In the same way that 'man'
and 'woman' define themselves reciprocally (though never
symmetrically), national identity is determined not on the basis of
its own intrinsic properties but as a function of what it (presumably) is not. 8
"Nationalism can only be analyzed concretely, on the basis of a specific
historical, social and political situation.,,9 Nevertheless, while recognizing
that no essential attributes of nationalism exist across all cultures and over
all time, general characteristics of nation building can be identified.
In a circular fashion, commentators frequently point to a composite of
fundamental aspects of national identity which purportedly define the nation
itself. The trick lies in determining which aspects of identity are fundamental. For Anthony Smith, a "nation is a named human population,
sharing historical territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass
public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for
all members."JO Ernest Gellner recognizes a somewhat different combination of aspects of identity which can combine to tie a community of people
into a nation: language, religion, history, territory, cultural practices, values,
historical myths and loyalties. II On the other hand, Benedict Anderson
steers clear of listing attributes of national identity, defining the nation
instead as "an imagined political community" which is "inherently limited
and sovereign.,,12 To Anderson, "the nation is always conceived as a deep
horizontal comradeship" - in his words: a "fraternity.,,13
Noticeably absent in these and other commonly proposed definitions of
nation is the recognition that all of the proposed aspects of national identity
are gendered 14 - i.e., that there is a gender component to everything from

Julie Mertus, Nationalism and the Use of Women's Bodies (presented at Columbia
University Feminist Legal Theory Conference (March 1993) (available from author). I now,
however, acknowledge that in practice feminisms can also be power hungry, exploitative
and imperialistic. Moreover, I realize that the important distinction is between chosen and
prescribed engendered national identities, not between bad nationalism and good feminisms.
8. Julie Mertus, Nationalism and the Use of Women's Bodies, supra note 7.
9. Vesna Pesic, Nationalism, War and Disintegration of Communist Federations: The
Yugoslav Case, in YUGOSLAVIA: COLLAPSE, WAR, CRIMES, supra note 5, at 37.
10. ANTHONY D. SMITH, NATIONAL IDENTITY 14 (1991).
11. ERNEST GELLNER, NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 7 (1983).
12. BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND
SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6 (1991).
13. [d. at 7.
14. See Anne McClintock, "No Longer in A Future Heaven": Women and Nationalism
in South Africa, TRANSITION 51, 104 (1991) ("All nationalisms are gendered") .
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the creation and perpetuation of shared myths 15 to the establishment of
common boundaries, to Anderson's imagined fraternity. Furthermore,
wholly apart from lists of attributes, gender itself plays a crucial role in the
defining of a nation. Women, for example, provide the blood-line that
determines citizenship in many nations. In the national folklore of most
nations women are the procreators, the symbol of the motherland, the
political victims, and not the political actors. 16
This essay examines the role that representations of women play in a
particular kind of engendered nationalisms - engendered nationalisms
imposed in haste and by force. It does not deal with engendered
nationalisms as lived cultural identities, nor as identities that unfold
gradually over time. 17 And, to the extent that identities can be "chosen"
by the Powerless l8 (for example, as survival mechanisms);9 this essay
does not address chosen identities, but those prescribed from above by the
Powerful. In other words, this essay is concerned about "state nationalism," not so-called "nationalism from below.,,20

15. For example, when Anthony Smith recognizes that the "myths and memories" of the
"dominant ethnic" help create the "presumed boundaries" of the nation, he fails to note both
that the process is a gendered one and that the myths may also contain a substantive gender
component. SMITH, supra note 10, at 14.
16. See, e.g., Geraldine Heng & Jandas Devan, State Fatherhood: The Politics of
Nationalism, Sexuality, and Race in Singapore, in NATIONALISMS AND SEXUALITIES, supra
note 7, at 349.
17. Some have also argued that nationalism is an "incurable phenomena," a "universal
characteristic of social life." See Pesie, supra note 9, at 53; Michael Walzer, The New
Tribalism, DISSENT, Spring 1992, at 164.
18. I adopt Vac1av Havel's term. See generally VACLAV HAVEL ET AL., THE POWER OF
THE POWERLESS: CITIZENS AGAINST THE STATE IN CENTRAL-EASTERN EUROPE (1985).
19. Use of the term "choice" is always problematic when those in power manipulate the
conditions under which decisions are made to such an extent that no range of choices is
truly "free." However, use of the word "choice" is important as it recognizes when people
are not only the subject but also the agent of their lives, thus granting them the dignity of
rising out of the "victim" status.
For example, in constructing their path of resistance to virulent Serbian nationalism
which feeds on oppression of all non-Serbs but particularly that of Albanians, the Albanians
of Kosovo have cultivated a unique Kosovar Albanian identity which serves both as a
mechanism for survival and a force that unites them against a greater power. This identity,
which places a premium on "dignity," "solidarity," "self-education," the cultivation of safe
"private spaces," and "self control," resembles yet is distinct from that of Albanians living
elsewhere. At the same time, the identity of Kosovian Albanians differs from that of others
who are oppressed elsewhere in the Balkans, such as the Muslims of Bosnia. Unlike the
instant, deadly force used against Muslims in Bosnia, the suffocating tactics employed
against the Kosovian Albanians have given them time to choose tools for resistance and to
create a society rooted in a strategy for resisting oppression. See JULIE MERTUS & VLATKA
MIHALIC, OPEN WOUNDS: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN Kosovo (1994). (These observations
come from a larger work in progress by the author.)
20. See Andjelka Milie, Women and Nationalism in the Former Yugoslavia, in GENDER
POLmCS AND POST-COMMUNISM: REFLECTIONS FROM EASTERN EUROPE AND THE FORMER
SOVIET UNION 109, 110 (Nanette Funk & Magda Mueller eds., 1993) [hereinafter Funk &
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The women of Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Slovenia,
Macedonia. . . Mars . . . could decide on their own components of national
identity. They could call themselves whatever they want - the "nation of
women," the "nation of Bosnian women," the "nation of Balkan women,"
the "nation of Yugoslav women" (defined in whatever terms they choose),
etc. They can act consciously in defining themselves or, through their
actions and reactions, they can unfold their list of attributes of national
identity gradually, as a form of resistance. No matter what approach
women take, they, like other disempowered groups, will not be seen by
those in power to present a legitimate alternative national identity. For
example, as Julie Mostov has noted,
A person of Serbian "descent" who rejects the national identity
crafted by the leaders of the Serbian community and wishes to
participate in politics as an individual or through a civic party or
broad coalition, does not present an alternative Serbian or civic
identity. She is merely a traitor to the nation, characterized in the
media as a self-hater or collaborator with the enemy.21
Many people in the former Yugoslavia - men and women alike - have
indeed rejected their government's vision of their national identity.22
Some have held steadfast to a vision of a Yugoslavian national identity,
others have put forth another alternative national identity (such as a multiethnic Bosnian, Croatian, or Serbian identity) and still others have rejected
the notion of national identity altogether. 23 Feminist and anti-war groups

Mueller]. In the context of Yugoslavia, Milic defines "nationalism from below" as
"patriotism, which spontaneously emerged as resistance to foreign fascist occupation, but
also as a result of the working majority's discontent with their previous social status in
society." [d. In contrast, "state nationalism" is a phenomena "which bore down with all
its might on the vacated social, ideological, and political arena." Id.
21. Julie Mostov, Democracy and the Politics of National Identity, in YUGOSLAVIA:
COLLAPSE, WAR, CRIMES, supra note 5, at 13, 21. Mostov notes that "members of the
peace movement in Serbia are good examples." [d.
22. For a discussion of such groups in Croatia, see JULIE MERTUS & RACHAEL PINE,
MEETING THE HEALTH NEEDS OF WOMEN SURVIVORS OF THE BALKAN CONFLIC! (1993)
(report available through The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, 120 Wall Street,
New York, NY 10005). A short list of such groups in Serbia includes the following:
Women in Black, the Belgrade Women's Center, Arkadia (gay and lesbian group), SOS
Rape Crisis Center for Women, SOS Rape Crisis Center for Girls, the Humanitarian Law
Fund (independent human rights law group), Civic Forum, Belgrade Circle, the Belgrade
Anti-War Center. (Source: authors' own work with such organizations). See also Jill
Benderly, Bosnia: No Place to Hide - No Place to Run: The Balkanization of Women's
Bodies, ON THE ISSUES, Summer 1993, at 40,42 (listing women's groups active on the issue
of rape in war); C. Carr, Battle Scars: Feminism and Nationalism Clash in the Balkans. THE
VILLAGE VOICE, July 13, 1993, at 25 (discussing nationalist conflicts among women's
groups in the Balkans.)
23. Observation from author's contacts with women from throughout the former
Yugoslavia.
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in particular have made an effort "not to slip into [the] trap of historical
inclusion" in nationalism. 24 While not discounting these extremely
important forms of rebellion and resistance, this essay focuses solely on the
Powerful's use of women in the building of national identity.

II.

BUILDING NATIONAL IDENTITIES: GENERAL
ELEMENTS

A primary task of nationalists is building the national identity. If a
society were homogeneous - sharing a common language, culture, history
and tradition - the task would be easy. But no society is perfectly
homogeneous. Thus, a sorting process must occur to establish who is
inside and who is outside the nation. This task of convincing people that
they "naturally" lie inside or outside a nation becomes a particularly
difficult one when discrete, homogeneous groupings are not easily
identifiable - due to intermarriage and changing boundaries, for example.
Given their multi-ethnic composition25 and history of changing
borders, the quest for nationhood by communities of the former Yugoslavia
"requires both an integrative process of 'nation-building' and an authenticating process establishing the 'natural' or ancient roots of the national
community. ,,26
Where history exists already, national leaders exploit and manipulate
its telling; where history doesn't suffice, nation builders tum to myth and
outright lies. As Yael Tamir has noted, there is a "compulsive tendency
to 'go back' to the ancestral origins of new nations, clinging to even the
faintest evidence of historical continuity and supporting blatantly false
claims in order to 'prove' that the nation's roots lie in the distant past .
,,27

24. Dasa Duhacek, Women's Time in the Former Yugoslavia, in Funk & Mueller, supra
note 20, at 131, 135. Duhacek notes that "[i]f successful, they would meet one of
Kristeva's criteria for the second generation of feminists, namely, 'the radical refusal of the
subjective limitations imposed by this history's time.'" [d. (quoting Julia Kristeva, Women's
Time, in THE KRISTEvA READER 195 (ToriI Moi ed., 1986».
25. Only Slovenia has a practically homogeneous population. Before the war,
governmental statistics found that non-Croats accounted for 23% of the population in
Croatia; non-Serbs 36% of the population in Serbia. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, Muslims
accounted for 43.7%, Serbs 31.3%, and Croats 17.3% of the population. Pesic, supra note
9, at 39 n.3.
26. Mostov, supra note 21, at 33. Mostov makes this observation with regard to Eastern
Europe in general.
27. Yael Tamir, The Right to National Self-Determination, 58 Soc. REs., 565, 572 (Fall
1991, No.3). See also Hedva Ben-Israel, Nationalism in Historical Perspective, 45 J. INT'L
AFF. 391 (Winter 1992) ("Such concepts as the shame of assimilation, the glory of national
sacrifice, the continuity of heroic lives and the everlasting value of 'authentic' cultural
treasures are the stock-in-trade of nationalist vocabulary ... the folklore is mined, the
archives are raided and feelings are stirred - to build up the emotional ecstacy and ethnic
cohesiveness ...").
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In war time, national folklorism gains added importance. Ivan Colovic
has observed that in sending their people off to war, leaders achieve "a
collective symbolic integration" by the strategy of "war-propaganda
mythologism (myth-making).,,28 He explains:
This time, the trick is to present the war as something eternal, that
is, to transfer the conflict from the sphere of politics, economics,
and history to the otherworldly sphere of myth. For the Serbs, the
war in Croatia is but another episode in the eternal battle against
their mythical enemies. 29
Integral to the fantasy of forced national unity, in war or peace, is the
process of essentializing difference:
In [the nation], differences are assimilated, destroyed, or assigned
to ghettos, to enclaves demarcated by boundaries so sharp that they
enable the nation to acknowledge the apparently singular and
clearly fenced-off differences within itself, while simultaneously
reaffirming the privileged homogeneity of the rest, as well as the
difference between itself and what lies over its frontiers. 30
The underbelly of nationalisms imposed from above achieves identification
by creating and crushing an "oppositional other,,31 - an essentialized
"Other" defined by its very difference to oneself.
It is through this process of creating an Other, Edward Said observes,
that one comes to think of oneself as "not-foreign. ,,32 When the line
between the members of the nation and the Other is in fact a blurry one
(such as when there are mixed marriages, desegregated communities, varied
migration patterns, and common languages and traditions - as in Bosnia,
for example), nation builders take extra pain to create threatening
differences. In this case, the "Other" becomes "The Enemy."
While all leaders in the former Yugoslavia have employed this
process,33 Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic is a particularly brilliant

28. Ivan Colovic, The Propaganda of War: Its Strategies, in YUGOSLAVIA: COLLAPSE,
WAR, CRIMES, supra note 5, at 115, 117.
29. Id.
30. Khachig Tololyan, The Nation-State and Its Others, DIASPORA, Spring 1991, at 6.
31. See JOAN COCKS, THE OPPOSITIONAL IMAGINATION (1989).
32. EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM 54 (1978).
33. Although less skillfully, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman responded with his own
selective presentations of myth and history. Several commentators have remarked that
Yugoslavia switched gears from communism to nationalism with remarkable speed.
Andjelka Milic explains this phenomenon as follows:
Although unexpected, the switch to nationalism by former communist parties
seems logical because the distance between the communist collectivist ideology,
based on such concepts as "the working class," "the class interest," and "the class
enemy," and the nationalist collective ideology, based on such concepts as
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master at the game. In order to justify his power play in Yugoslavia,34
Milosevic created an enemy large enough to turn neighbor against
neighbor. Only an enemy that was powerful enough to endanger Serbian
security and hegemony would justify the use of violence. Only an enemy
that was dehumanized and "evil" would galvanize the Serbian people to
take up arms in defense of themselves. Croats and Muslims were
conveniently at hand. Painting all Croats as reincarnations of supporters
of the U stasa Nazi state, and Muslims as loyal descendants of the Ottoman
Turks who subjugated Serbs for 500 years, Milosevic manipulated history
to justify the use of force in the name of protecting all Serbian people.
Milosevic has also distorted history and perpetuated myths in order to
justify use of force against the Albanians of Kosovo, the tension-filled
southern province of Serbia. Milosevic rose to power by exploiting antiAlbanian sentiment among Serbs, promising to protect Serbs living in
Kosovo from "Albanian terrorists," and to regain control of what has long
been seen as the cradle of Serbian civilization - the sacred land of
KoSOVO. 35 Thus, Albanians, long before Croats and Muslims, have been
a convenient Enemy Other, against which Milosevic could define the
"Serbian" national identity.
Milosevic and other nationalists, both in Serbia and elsewhere in the
region, have used real and imagined images of Woman in three steps of
nation building: constructing, tearing down, and consolidating national
identities. And, to a large extent, through their images and stories, local 36

"nation," "the national interest," and "the national enemy" is much shorter than
the distance between communism and democracy.
Milie, supra note 20, at 110. I'll note that I'm not in complete agreement with Milie on
this characterization, but a full discussion is left to a later day.
34. I take as my premise that at the onset of the most recent Balkanian conflict the
struggle for power was paramount: the exploitation of ethnic hatred subsidiary, the fuel, the
aftereffect, but not in and of itself the cause of the conflict. While there is considerable
disagreement on this issue, many commentators with a knowledge of relevant history
support this thesis. See, e.g., BRANKA MAGAS, THE DESTRUCTION OF YUGOSLAVIA:
TRACKING THE BREAK-UP 1980-92 159-238 (1993).
35. True to his word, in 1990 Milosevic introduced constitutional amendments that
stripped Kosovo of its autonomous status and rendered it subservient to Belgrade. Now,
with the world's attention diverted by the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbian
authorities feel free to act with impunity in Kosovo, intensifying their campaign of forced
displacement, harassment, arrest, and torture of Kosovian Albanians. See MERTUS &
MIHALIC, supra note 19; see also HELSINKI WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN Kosovo
(October 1992).
36. A report of the CSCE Human Rights Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia noted in
1992:
The increase in nationalism has also led to a war in the media in particular in
Serbia and Croatia. Facts are distorted, data falsified and sometimes atrocities
invented in order to contribute to the atmosphere of mutual hatred. Neither the
Government of Serbia nor that of Croatia seem to do anything to stop this
incitement to ethnic hatred. This kind of nationalistic propaganda has also a
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and international journalists have perpetuated this instrumental use of
women. The following sections provide examples of each step of the use
of women in nation-building, all in the context of ex-Yugoslavia. 37

III.

THE USE OF WOMEN IN SERVICE OF NATIONAL
IDENTITY

Essentialist views of "Woman" have been particularly useful in creating
and perpetuating the oppositional imagination of the nation, both in the
former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. 38 Nationalists use the fantasy of the
essentialized Woman - either "Our Woman" or "Enemy Woman" - in
a particular, engendered manner. As Zillah Eisenstein has observed:
Woman is not constructed as 'foreigner' in the same way as the
status of other 'others' are. Her otherness is constructed differently. Women construct the very meaning of 'otherness' while never
being identified as 'the' other. They represent the unnamed, the
absence, in order to name the 'other' others. 39
Nationalists name women, but not for what they are and, thus, "[t]he
nationalizing of identity makes woman visible while ascribing invisibility
to her.,,4Q In the context of ex-Yugoslavia, the state-controlled media
pumps out carefully drafted images of women that render real women's
problems and interests invisible. Slavenka Drakulic notes that in the
Croatian media:

negative effect on individual freedom. Anybody who does not agree with the
national majority is disciplined by his colleagues and his superiors; any attempt
toward moderation is looked at with suspicion.
Report of the CSCE Human Rights Rapporteur Mission to Yugoslavia, CSCE Communication No. 41, Prague, Jan. 24, 1992, at 5. See generally Threats to Press Freedoms: A

Report Prepared for the Free Media Seminar Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Eastern Europe, NEWS FROM HELSINKI WATCH (Human Rights WatchlHelsinki, New York,
N.Y.), Nov. 1993, Issue 21, at 5. For a discussion of potential legal challenges to control
of the media in ex-Yugoslavia, see Francoise Hampson, Responsibility of and for the Media
in the Conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia, in YUGOSLAVIA: COLLAPSE, WAR, CRIMES, supra
note 5, at 79.
37. These observations on the use of women to build national identity apply generally
across cultures and continents and throughout time. For an expanded discussion of the use
of women to build nations in other contexts, see generally FLOYA ANTHIAS & NIRA Yuv ALDAVIS, WOMAN, NATION, STATE (1989); McClintock, supra note 14, at 105; KUMARI
JAYAWARDENA, FEMINISM AND NATIONALISM IN THE THIRD WORLD (1986).
38. See RENATA SALECL, THE SPOILS OF FREEDOM: PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM
AFTER THE FALL OF SOCIALISM (1994); Renata Saled, Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, and
Anti-Feminism in Eastern Europe, 57 NEW GERMAN CRITIQUE 51 (Fall 1992) (writing on
a fantasy structure that supports ethnic hatred and propels nationalism).
39. Zillah Eisenstein, Seeing Women in Eastern European Nationalism: PostCommunism's 'New-Old' Borders and Women's Bodies 5 (Dec. 1993) (unpublished paper
on file with author and with Hastings Women's Law Journal).
40. [d.
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Women are praised in the media as mothers, but there are no
articles or discussions about the facts that they form the largest
percentage of the unemployed, that they are underpaid, and that
they are in a very difficult position if they are single mothers.
Women's problems, such as the feminization of poverty, are not
"interesting" to the new govemment. 41
Belgrade feminist Dasa Duhacek similarly observes that the media in Serbia
leapt at the chance to cover the 1990 demonstrations purportedly organized
by a group called "Women's Movement for Yugoslavia." This group
boasted pictures of Milosevic as a defender of peace under the slogan
"Yugoslavia, peace, and bread.,,42
But when demonstrations were
organized against the war by Women in Black and other groups, the media
spouted critical articles at first and then quickly lost interest. 43
Since women belong to all nations but at no time define a single
nation, they "are inside/outside nations in a very particular way.,,44
Women hold a unique position in engendered nationalist discourse, a place
which is never wholly on either the inside or outside of the nation.
Straddling the border, Woman becomes the border. 45 As explained below,
nationalists readily use the real and imagined Woman in constructing the
border between self and "other," in tearing down the other's identity, and
in consolidating and perpetrating the boundaries of national identity.
A.

"WOMAN" USED TO CONSTRUCT A NATIONAL IDENTITY

"Our Woman" serves a three-fold role in constructing the borders of
national identity. First, Woman is seen as the bearer of future members of
the nation and, second, as the caretaker of the "Family," Woman is viewed
as integral to reproducing the ideological constructs of the nation by
transmitting its culture to new generations. 46

41. Slavenka Drakulic, Women and the New Democracy in the Former Yugoslavia, in
Funk & Mueller, supra note 20, at 123, 127.
42. Duhacek, supra note 24, at 134.
43. Observation based on reading the press in Belgrade and on interviews with women
groups in Belgrade in 1993 and 1994.
44. Eisenstein, supra note 39, at 5. Eisenstein observes that women "are never spoken
of like 'the' Jew, or 'the' Black, or 'the' Roma, or 'the' foreigner." Id. I agree that while
the image of "the" woman appears in nationalist discourse, it is in the context of a particular
type of woman, i.e., a woman divided, further classified by ethnicity or nation. It is no
accident, I suggest, that the fantasy of a "Woman's nation" has never taken hold. As
Eisenstein acknowledges, "[t]here is a politics to 'seeing' especially when erasure and
invisibility define one's presence." Id.
45. In Julie Kristeva's terms, women are "boundary subjects." JULIE KRISTEVA, NATIONS
WITHOUT NATIONALISM 35 (1993).
46. This observation is taken directly from Anthias & Yuval-Davis, Introduction to
WOMAN, NATION, STATE, supra note 37, at 7.
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The emerging struggle over reproductive freedom in Croatia serves as
a good illustration of the role of women in both regards. 47 Reproductive
freedom had been taken for granted in the former Yugoslavia. 48 Now,
however, as the newly emerging nations struggle to replenish themselves
during wartime, a vocal and growing contingent of pro-life groups have
emerged, particularly in Croatia, branding women who forgo their
childbearing and childraising roles as "unpatriotic" or even "dangerous.,,49
The ruling Croatian party, HDZ, continually uses the concept of "fruitful
virgin-mother" in public speeches addressing women as a group.50 The
new constitutions of Slovenia and Croatia contain vague provisions that
could be interpreted to deny women's right to abortion in order to protect
a competing right to "life.,,51 In a similar vein, politicians in Zagreb have
pushed a spate of "pro-family" legislative proposals that include, among
other provisions, a formula for calculating pensions that accounts for time
spent raising children. 52
Belgrade nationalists also exploit the vision of woman as mother and
caretaker. Propaganda about large Albanian families, exploiting real and
imagined fears about a Kosovo overpopulated by Albanians, has been used
to encourage the "right women" - the Serbs - to have children and to
dissuade the "wrong women" - the Albanians - to refrain from having
children. 53 Serbian lawmakers have fashioned drafts of laws on "population policy," "social care for children," and "labor relations" in a manner
that encourages Serbian, not Albanian, women to stay at home and have
children. Among their many provisions, the laws grant maternity leave
based on an exponential formula, so that women are rewarded once they
have a third child. 54

47. Note that this and other examples throughout the text are only one illustration. Many
additional illustrations exist which are not mentioned here.
48. See Duhacek, supra note 24, at 131; Milica Antic, Yugoslavia: The Transitional Spirit
of the Age, in SUPERWOMEN AND THE DOUBLE BURDEN 178 (Chris Corrin ed., 1992).
49. Observations drawn from attending hearings of pro-life groups in Zagreb in MarchApril, 1994.
50. Drakulie, supra note 41, at 123.
51. Article 21 of the Croatian Constitution states that "Every human being has the right
to life." (Constitution on file with author.) For a discussion of the drafting process and the
particular provisions problematic for women, see Drakulie, supra note 41, at 124.
52. Interestingly, some feminists and "anti-choice" activists have found themselves united
in their opposition to such proposals - the feminists because the provisions may coerce
women to stay at home with children, and the "anti-choice" activists because the proposals
do not offer sufficient inducements for childrearing.
53. Milie, supra note 20, at 112-113. Some commentators have claimed that Serbs used
"forced sterilization" programs and "population control" against the Kosovian Albanians.
See, e.g., Bosnia: No Place to Hide - No Place to Run, supra note 22, at 41 ("Serbian
lawmakers sought to enforce population control on Albanian women in Kosovo"). In my
own research in Kosovo, I have not documented incidents of forced sterilization.
54. Milie, supra note 20, at 113.
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A third role for women is that of a symbolic and emotional catalyst for
the nation. As Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis have remarked,
Woman serves as a "focus and symbol in ideological discourses used in the
construction, reproduction, and transformation of ethnic/national categories.,,55 Our Woman thus becomes the symbol of the nation, variably as:
Mother, Protector, Warrior, Victim, Martyr, and Matriarch. "Unable to
produce its own history in response to its [lack of] inner sense of identity,
nationalist ideology sets up Woman as victim and goddess simultaneously."56
Media accounts in the Balkans create a national romance with the
plight of Woman, and these images of Woman are at times further
perpetuated by government officials for their own political advantage.
"When [journalists] find a woman who went through all the horrors
[particularly of rape in war], they would like them to tell their stories in
full, preferably with all of the details," explains Jadranka, an Omarska
concentration camp survivor now working on collecting evidence of war
Nusreta, another volunteer (also a refugee herself) working
crimes. 57
with refugee women from Bosnia, remembers:
While I was working for Camp Resnik, journalists and TV
crews kept coming and asking, "Are there any raped
women here?" You know, we cannot divide women into
those who were raped and those who were not, as if they
are exhibits on a display . .. This is what hurts me.
Women are stamped as raped women as if they don't have
any other characteristics, as if this is the only element of
their identity. 58

55. ANTHIAS & YUVAL-DAVIS, supra note 37, at 7. Women may also affirmatively
contribute to the construction of national identity by defending the nation and participating
in its political, economic and social struggles. [d.
56. R. Radhakrishnan, Nationalism, Gender, and the Narrative of Identity, in
NATIONALISMS AND SEXUALITIES, supra note 7, at 85.
57. Transcript of interview with Jadranka, Omarska concentration camp survivor (July
1993)(transcript on file with author). Jadranka also explained how journalists' actions are
affecting the women survivors:
These people [journalists] are leaving a mark on the witnesses. When a witness
has to deal with two or three of such journalists, who are only after the sensations,
the witness sees that hislher story is only for the sake of the public and that he/she
is only the object of the story .... [The] witness [then] disappears] and that is a
tragic loss.
[d.
58. Interview with Nusreta by film maker Mandy Jacobson (Sept. 1993) (transcript and
footage of interview on file with Mandy Jacobson, Bowery Productions, New York, NY).
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The sensational photographs of rows of "rape victims" - without any
mention of women survivors like Jadranka and Nusreta - in Time and
Newsweek are only one example of this phenomenon. 59
In exploiting alarm over the security of Serbs in Kosovo, Milosevic and
his followers turned to a popular image of woman as victim and warrior that of an armed Serbian woman carrying a baby. The message was loud
and clear: as a good patriotlmartyr/victimlmother, the Serbian woman was
defending her family and country against the evil of the Other - the
Kosovo Albanian. Belgrade feminist Andjelka Milic explained:
[The photograph] brought together and symbolized all of
the salient aspects of national identity and what threatened
it: the nation's sense of jeopardy was clearly depicted by
the mother and child defending themselves, by her readiness to defend her identity by means of arms but also to
persevere as perhaps the last member of the nation. This
photograph helped galvanize Serbian public opinion around
the threat to the Serbian minority in Kosovo and to create
resolve to settle this situation in favor of the Serbian
minority by force if need be. 60
In a like manner, the media in Croatia had a field day with the image of
Croatian mothers against the war. At the beginning of the war against
Croatia in 1991, these women - some of whom later called their group
"Chain of Love" or "Wall of Love" (Bedem Ljubavi) - marched to
demand that their sons be released from the Yugoslavian army that was
attacking Vukovar and other Croatian towns. 61 While these women aimed
at first to be "anti-war," many of them later actually enrolled their sons in
the Croatian army. In addition, although this group began as an independent organization, it soon developed close ties to the Croatian government. 62 In the words of Jill Benderly, an American feminist who has
worked with women's groups in ex-Yugoslavia for a dozen years, "'Wall
of Love' ... was little more than a cheering squad on behalf of Croatian
president Franjo Tudjman.,,63 The media's readiness in propagating the
image of "mothers against war" only aided nationalists' instrumental use
of women in this regard.

59. See, e.g., Lanee Morrow, Unspeakable, TIME, Feb. 22, 1993, at 48; Tom Post, A
Pattern of Rape, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 4, 1993, at 32.
60. Milie, supra note 20, at 115.
61. Drakulie, supra note 41, at 129. See also Ingrid Zie, Ljubavlju naoruzan zenski
narod, NOVI TJEDNIK, Sept. 5, 1991.
62. Duhacek, supra note 24, at 134.
63. Benderly, supra note 53, at 42.
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"WOMAN" USED TO TEAR DOWN AN "OTHER'S" NATIONAL IDENTITY

As noted above, as part of the nation building process, the nation
creates a "fantasy of an enemy, an alien who has insinuated himself into
our society and constantly threatens us with habits, discourse, and rituals
which are not 'our kind. ",64 With regard to the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia, enemies abound. 65 Croats and Muslims invoke the image of
the Cetnik, the Serbian force that during the Second World War fought
against the occupying Axis powers and called for the restoration of the
Serbian monarchy and the creation of a "Greater Serbia;" the Cetniks also
fought against the pro-Nazi Ustasa forces of Croatia and Tito's communist
Partisans and committed atrocities against Muslims and Croats, particularly
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 66 On the other hand, some Serbian military and
paramilitary forces refer to Croats as "Ustase," the Croatian fascists backed
by both the Nazi and Italian fascist governments during World War II, and
Muslims as "Turks," associating Muslims with the Ottoman rulers who
reigned over most of Serbia from 1371 to 1871. The state-controlled (or,
at least, state-manipulated) media, in tum, continually draws and exploits
these images of the enemy. 67
Intertwined in this process, the image of "Enemy Woman" provides a
particularly potent brew for nation-builders. Enemy Woman's real and
imagined body becomes a tool by which the nation can "project [its] own
desires and deficiencies on an [O]ther.,,68 In this vein, the nation will kill,
rape, and forcibly impregnate the Other's Woman as a method of
humiliating the Other, and as a means of conquering their souls. The
Enemy Woman becomes ugly and dirty, violated by rape and sin, while the
nation's own Woman is venerated, clean and noble.
Wartime rapes have been committed by all sides in the Balkan conflict,
and research indicates that Bosnian Serb troops have employed rape of
Muslim women as an element of its publicly announced plan of "ethnic
cleansing," terrorizing and forcibly moving or otherwise extinguishing

64. Renata Salecl, National Identity and Socialist Moral Majority, 12 NEW FORMATIONS
25 (Winter 1990).
65. For a list of some of the specific heroes and their adversaries in the ex-Yugoslav
conflict, see Colovic, supra note 28, at 115, 117.
66. The Yugoslavian army and some Serbian paramilitary groups vehemently reject the
label "Cetnik," claiming that they are merely defenders of their people and their land and
that they are not extremists. Others, such as paramilitary units, commonly refer to
themselves as Cetniks.
67. For an excellent discussion of the propaganda machine in Belgrade, see Lukovic,
supra note 5, at 74.
68. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Nationalisms and Sexualities in the Age of Wilde, in
NATIONALISMS AND SEXUALITIES, supra note 7, at 238.
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Muslim populations from Bosnia-Herzegovina. 69 Through these attacks on
Muslim women, Bosnian Serb soldiers seek to destroy the very soul of the
real and imagined Muslim nation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As Zillah
Eisenstein has observed, "[r]ape violates 'others' and establishes [greater]
Serbia at the same time. ,,70
Images of the Enemy Woman are perpetuated despite women's actual
experiences, not because of them. For example, Bosnian Serb troops target
Muslim women in Bosnia-Herzegovina for rape71 because Muslim women
are supposed to be especially "virtuous" and revered by their communities
and, thus, their rapes are particularly harmful to the enemy. In addition,
according to what some soldiers have told women while raping them, part
of the purpose of the rapes is to add Serbian sperm and, in this manner, to
render them impure. In reality, however, many of the women raped are of
mixed marriages or mixed parentage and, thus, not even capable of being
"pure" and "virtuous."n
At the same time, according to many activists and government workers
in Croatia, the government-controlled Croatian media widely publicized
rapes of Muslim women while, at the same time, de-emphasizing rapes of
Croatian women. 73 One explanation could be that Croatia wanted to
maintain its image of its own Woman as "pure" and "clean." Yet, it was
fine to portray Muslim Woman as violated - these images served well to

69. See HELSINKI WATCH, WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA VOLUME II 21-23
(1993) [hereinafter WATCH REPORT, VOL. II]; Slavenka Drakulic, Women Hide Behind a
Wall of Silence, THE NATION, Mar. 1, 1993, at 253, 256; Jeri Laber, Bosnia - Questions
About Rape, THE N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Mar. 25, 1993 at 3-6; Laura Pitter & Alexandra
Stiglmayer, Will the World Remember? Can the Women Forget?, Ms., Mar'/Apr. 1993, at
19-22; Paul Lewis, Rape Was a Weapon of Serbs, u.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1993,
at AI; Alan Riding, European Inquiry Says Serbs' Forces Have Raped 20,000, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 1993, at AI; William Drozdiak, Serb Forces Rape 20,000 in Bosnia, EC Team
Finds, WASH. POST, Jan. 9, 1993, at A12; John Bums, A Serbian Fighter's Path of
Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1992, at AI.
70. Eisenstein, supra note 39, at 4 (citing Drakulic, supra note 69; Laber, supra note 69;
Pitter & Stiglmayer, supra note 69; Riding, supra note 69; and Lewis, supra note 69).
71. See WATCH REPORT, VOL. II, supra note 69, at 21-23. According to K.S., for
example, Serbian soldiers raped her and threatened her life while specifically identifying her
as a Bosnian Muslim. Id. at 173, 175 n.227. Another woman, B., testifies that Serbian
soldiers specifically stated their intent to impregnate women while raping them. Id. at 215,
218, 219.
72. See Pitter & Stiglmayer, supra note 69. In this sense, women's virtue is constructed
in order to be defended. Cf. Donna Guy, "White Slavery," Citizenship and Nationality in
Argentina, in NATIONALISMS AND SEXUALITIES, supra note 7, at 202. See also Christine
Obbo, Sexuality and Economic Domination in Uganda, in ANTHIAS & Yuv AL-DA VIS, supra
note 37, at 85. "Human societies always portray their women as more virtuous than women
of other groups and therefore in need of protection. Never mind that each society also
coerces women to be 'good women' through imposing a number of sanctions against 'bad
women. '" Id.
73. This observation is drawn from my field work in Croatia in February, 1993. See
MERTUS & PINE, supra note 22.
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draw attention to the perpetrator: the Enemy Serb. The impact on Muslim
women really did not matter; after all, the image of Muslim Woman was
a constructed fantasy "Other" to begin with, as the so-called Muslim
women of Bosnia identified themselves as "Muslim" in only a vague,
cultural way before the war.
C.

"WOMAN" USED TO CRUSH INSUBORDINATION TO THE NATIONAL
IDENTITY

"Nations are forever haunted by their definitional others,,,74 however
the Other is constructed. Nations need both to exploit and administer
difference in order to perpetuate the myth of homogeneity and punish those
who violate this myth. 75 Nationalists seem well aware that "because
women are used as a site to construct borders they also provide a possible
site for the subversion of nationalist aggressions.,,76 The nation can
consolidate its identity by projecting beyond its borders the sexual practices
and gender roles it deems abhorrent, while simultaneously penalizing those
who reject their assigned gender roles. 77
Any conduct, male or female, which challenges prescribed gender roles
may be viewed as antithetical to the interests of the state and suppressed
through legal and social sanctions. While homosocial male conduct is
tolerated by many nationalisms (particularly those envisioning a fraternal
horizontal community),78 the nation draws a line at same-sex sexual
conduct. In the name of safeguarding and distinguishing "proper" fraternal
brotherhood from "improper" male-to-male sexual acts, a nervous nation
often employs penal sanctions. 79
In the discourse of nationalist war propaganda, battle is presented as the
"manifestation of masculinity." Ivan Colovic observes:
The war is not for weaklings, gays, cowards or crybabies,
but for real, big, tough men, who exude virility and a
distinct smell. ... A report on Belgrade Television

74. PARKER, supra note 7, at 5.
75. See, e.g., GEORGE MOSSE, NATIONALISM AND SEXUALITY: MIDDLE CLASS
MORALITY AND SEXUAL NORMS IN MODERN EUROPE 9 (1985) (bourgeois sexuality used
to advance the political goals of the nation state).
76. Eisenstein, supra note 39, at 6. Perhaps for this reason, nationalists have harassed
the Belgrade anti-war group "Women in Black" with increasing frequency. (Observation
from author's trip to Serbia in April 1994 and conversations with members of Women in
Black.)
77. PARKER, supra note 7, at to.
78. MOSSE, supra note 75, at 67 ("nationalism had a special affinity for male society and
together with the concept of respectability legitimized the domination of men over
women."); see also ANDERSON, supra note 12, at 16.
79. See, e.g., Lee Edelman, Tearooms and Sympathy, or, The Epistemology o/the Water
Closet, in NATIONALISMS AND SEXUALITIES, supra note 7, at 263.
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recently showed a story about a group of soldiers preparing
to cross a minefield. The officer encouraged them by
saying: "Whoever is man enough, let him join us !"so
Many groups in the Balkans portray enemies of their nation as "soft" or
"feminine," - faggots, incapable of leading, desirous only of being led.
In Montenegro, for example, graffiti decries enemy politicians as pederasts
or sodomites. 81 Similarly, angered by Belgrade peace activists rallying in
support of the citizens of Sarajevo, one Serbian writer, Momo Kapor stated:
Those small, insignificant parties in Belgrade will always find as
many lesbians, homosexuals, philatelists, whatever you want,
members of doberman dog owners clubs, mountain climbers, or
writers, who will support them in anything. 82
In this case, Vojin Dimitrijevic notes, "lesbians and homosexuals, who are
anathema to patriarchal societies and who nationalists say never existed in
the good old days [along with] other groups are also identified with
perverse habits introduced into primeval society from the 'West': stamp
collecting, owning 'useless' dogs as pets, and mountain climbing.,,83
In general, all nonreproductively-oriented sexualities are excluded from
the discourse of the nation. It is no accident that oppression of gay men
and lesbians in Serbia has intensified since the war began. Serbia has long
maintained "pink lists," lists of suspected gay men (lesbians are invisible),
and have detained and harassed gay men for the slightest provocation. In
February 1993, for example, police took Z.R., a 36-year-old gay man into
custody, purportedly for "listening to Ustasa music" (Croatian music) and
"spreading false information" (he was a regular guest on a radio show).
Once at the police station, however, they questioned him about the
Belgrade gay and lesbian organization, Arkadia. Z.R. testified:
[T]the two policemen who arrested me were most interested in the
list of members of Arkadia, which I refused to give them....
Since I insisted that the list didn't exist, they started hitting me.
All three of them beat me, but not continuously. They were
kicking me in the legs, and with fists on the body. This lasted for
about an hour . . . .84

80. Colovic, supra note 28, at 118.
81. Observation drawn from my own trip to Montenegro (Sept. 1993).
82. Vojin Dimitrijevic, Xenophobia as a Menace to Human Rights in Former Socialist
Countries, in YUGOSLAVIA: COLLAPSE, WAR, CRIMES, supra note 5, at 65, 70 (citing
VREME, May 11, 1992, at 51).
83. [d.
84. Testimony complied by Helsinki Watch in Abuses Continue in the Former
Yugoslavia: Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Hercegovina, NEWS FROM HELSINKI WATCH
(Human Rights WatchlHelsinki, New York, N.Y.), July 1993, Issue 11, at 4.
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Z.R. was arrested again on trumped-up charges less than a month later. 85
Z.R. attributes the attacks against him and other gays in Serbia directly to
intensified nationalist feelings and distrust of "others. ,,86
Vesna Pesic observes how nation builders in ex-Yugoslavia have
deliberately rebuilt and promoted patriarchal social structures:
Rather than creating a civil society and a democratic state,
patriarchal social structures were restored, particularly in the rural
and mountainous parts of the country where the armed conflicts
acquired the most intense and brutal form. . .. These patriarchal
structures provided the conditions not only for genocide, but also
for the destruction of towns and cities ....87
As observed earlier, labor and child care legislation88 in various parts of
ex-Yugoslavia conflates woman's proper role in society with her proper
role in Family, the imagined mini-nation designed to advance a political
agenda. 89
Because the image of nation is so deeply rooted in patriarchal symbols
and structures, a woman who challenges her prescribed gender role in the
Family is not a Woman at all, but a traitor to the nation. Conversely, those
who wish to slander women already judged to be traitors artfully accuse
them of being lesbians - The Joan of Arc Syndrome. 90 Women writers
in the Balkans who have spoken out against their governments' policies
have been accused of being lesbians, communists, CIA agents, and a host
of other evils. 91 The status of traitor becomes intricately linked to the real
and imagined status of lesbian.
The nation's threat of exclusion and other legal and extra-legal
sanctions can force women to choose between their identity as women and
their identities as members of the nation, and compel male members of
society who do not fit prescribed gender roles to choose between their
identities and that of the nation. In the Balkans, such men and women who
are seen as threats to some national identity have been attacked by the

85. Id.
86. Interview with Z.R., in Belgrade, (Spring 1994).
87. PeSic, supra note 9, at 54.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 52-54.
89. See, e.g., Gayle Rubin, The Traffic in Women, in WOMEN, CLAss AND THE FEMINIST
IMAGINATION: A SOCIALIST FEMINIST READER 106 (Karen V. Hansen & Ilene J. Philpson
eds., 1990).
90. My term.
91. See Meredith Tax, Five Women Who Won't Be Silenced, THE NATION, May 10, 1993,
at 624,625.
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government and opposition groups alike.92 By failing to recognize these
attacks for what they are, the media has in tum only perpetuated them.

IV.

CONCLUSION

As long as they exist, nations will continue to attempt to harness
Woman in service of their national identities. By recognizing this trend,
however, we will begin to strip it of its potency. The media can counterbalance nations' misuse of Woman by challenging state-promulgated,
mythical images of Woman with accurate, countervailing images of women
as activists. Yes, the war in the Balkans has created a large number of
women victims, all of whom deserve redress. However, these women stand
to gain nothing from further exploitation. Rather, all women - victims,
activists, activist victims - would benefit if we recognized the full breadth
of their lived realities and allowed all women to voice their differing
struggles.

92. In Croatia, for example, pro-Croatian women groups have lesbian-baited other
women's groups who do not take a nationalistic line. (This observation is from my own
experiences speaking with several women's groups in February, 1993.)

